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The aim of this work is to (1) analyse whether countries differ on political indicators 
(democracy, rule of law, government effectiveness and corruption) and (2) study whether 
countries with different political profiles are associated with different levels of economic, 
human development and gender-related development indicators. Using a fuzzy classification 
approach (fuzzy k-means algorithm), we propose a typology of 124 countries based on 10 
political variables. Six segments are identified; these political groups implicate the access to 
different levels of economic and human development. In this study evidence of a positive but 
not perfect relationship between democracy and economic and human development is 
observed, thus presenting new insights for the understanding of the heterogeneity of behaviors 
relatively to political indicators. 
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th century we witnessed a significant expansion in the number of sovereign 
states and the number of governments democratically elected. In fact, “[i]n a very real sense, 
the 20th century has become the ´democratic century’” (Freedom House, 2002: 1).  
In 1900 no country could be classified as an electoral democracy by universal suffrage, with 
multiparty elections. In the beginning of the 20
th century, 25 countries are classified by 
Freedom House (1999) as having 'Restricted Democratic Practices' (Table 1), i.e., regimes 
where the dominant party controlled civil laws or the freedom of press or where the right to 
vote was denied women, ethnic segments, racial minorities, or the impoverished. Democracy, 
as a national political system, won great acceptance in the last half of the last century, 
motivated by the defeat of the Nazi totalitarianism, the process of post war decolonization and 
the reconstruction of Europe and of Japan (Freedom House, 2002). The percentage of 
population that lives under electoral governments with universal suffrage increased from 31% 
in 1950 up to 58,3% in the year 2000, and 98 countries took their steps towards democracy; 
these movements increased since the 70s - denominated as the ‘democratic age’ (Freedom 
House, 2002: 2). In spite of this, nowadays some countries still live under authoritarian 
regimes and some new democratic nations didn't get stabilization and therefore retreated in 
the political regime; other countries that took steps towards democracy are still in a semi-
democratic phase. As for the countries considered democratic, in the objective sense of the 
existence of free, competitive elections and electoral participation, these possess different 
results in terms of political organization, civil freedom, political rights, freedom of the press, 
voice and accountability, political stability and the lack of violence, law and order, rules of 
law, government effectiveness and graft (PNUD, 2002).  
In this context, heterogeneity of behaviors in relation to political factors should be 
systematized, enabling the identification of countries with similar profiles.  3 
Table 1: Classification of the countries – political regime 
2000 1950 1900 2000 1950 1900
Democracy 120 22 0 3439,4 743,2 0
Restricted Democratic Practice 16 21 25 297,6 285,9 206,6
Constitutional Monarchy 0 9 19 0 77,9 299,3
Traditional Monarchy 10 4 6 58,2 16,4 22,5
Absolute Monarchy 0 2 5 0 12,5 610
Authoritarian Regime 39 10 0 1967,7 122 0
Totolitarian Regime 5 12 0 141,9 816,7 0
Colonial Dependency 0 43 55 0 118,4 503
Protectorate 2 31 20 4,8 203,3 26,5
Total 192 154 130 5909,6 2396,3 1668
Sovereign States and Colonial Units Population (millions)
 
Source: Freedom House (2002: 3) 
Democracy can be defined, according to the United Nations proposal, as a system of 
institutionalized procedures for open and competitive political participation, the main 
government leaders' election and substantial limits to the leaders' powers (PNUD, 2002). 
However the word democracy, in Greek, means, “ruled by the people”, summarizing a 
governing approach for human development, expressing the idea that people are in first place. 
In this work we aim at investigating two interrelated subjects: 1) to what extent countries 
stand out due to structural political conditions, namely democratization, citizens' participation 
and transparency, government effectiveness and legislation; 2) whether countries associated 
to different typologies of political variables are associated to different levels of economic and 
human development.   
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we survey some studies on the concepts of 
democracy and economic development and the relationship between these two variables. Next 
(Section 3) methodological options, concerning variables and classification method, are 
presented. In Section 4 we propose the classification of 124
1 countries based on 10 political 
variables using a fuzzy classification approach, having been developed for this purpose a 
computer program that includes the fuzzy k-means method (FKM). In Section 5 we verify 
whether the formed segments are reflected in the economic indicator (Gross Disposable 
Income  per capita) and in the development well to being indicators (HDI - Human 
                                                 
1 All the countries that had statistical data available for all variables were selected.  4 
Development Index and GDI- Gender-Related Development Index), by using multiple lineal 
regression models. Finally, we present a conclusive synthesis.   
2. Economic development and democracy: an overview   
Why is a positive relationship between democracy and economic development expected? Do 
richer countries have larger probability of being democratic? Is democracy a prerequisite for 
economic development? Or is economic development a prerequisite for democracy? The 
study of the relationship between Democracy and Development is widely discussed and a 
multidisciplinary theme (Ramaswamy and Cason, 2003) - the literature in the political science 
and economy area offers a great variety of answers to these questions. 
Many investigators, both in theoretical and empirical terms, support the hypothesis of the 
existence of a positive relationship between democracy and development. Lipset’s (1959) 
pioneering work has inspired a great number of empirical studies about the relationship 
between Democracy and Development. The author argued that in a country with a higher 
development rate the population possesses larger probability of believing in the democratic 
values that will support a democratic system. According to the author, only in a society where 
there is well-being can intelligent participation in political subjects be verified – “the mass of 
the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint 
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. The society 
divided between the large impoverished mass and small favored elite would result either in 
oligarchy (…) or in tyranny” (Lipset, 1959: 75). 
Studies on the relationship between democracy and development reveal the existence of a 
positive relationship between the two variables (e.g. Cutright, 1963; Neubauer, 1967; Olsen, 
1968; Jackman, 1973; Bollen, 1979, 1980, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Burkhart and 
Lewis-Beck, 1994), in spite of the differences in the methodological options. The differences 
in the studies can be grouped into six topics: measurement of democracy; measurement of 
development and other variables; countries in the study (sample); period of study; nature of 
the quantitative methods used; type of relationship tested (lineal versus non-linear). 
Measurement of democracy   
Although all the studies use the same theoretical concept of democracy, its quantification 
form varies, from the definition as a non-metric variable (through categories) (e.g., 
Gasiorowski, 1996; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) to the use of indexes developed or 
compiled by international organizations (Bollen and Paxon, 2000). 5 
In this study several subjective indicators are used that intend to evaluate the extension of 
Democracy and Civil and Political laws of the various countries. In relation to previous 
studies, variables that are not limited to the concept of Democracy are considered, 
emphasizing the Evaluation of the Government (Table 2).   
Measurement of development 
The empirical tests of the relationship between democracy and development have been 
developing according to two lines. The first approach, considered by Lipset (1959), analyzes 
the relationship between development and democracy by crossing the levels of development 
and democracy. In this investigation line, there are studies that use either monetary indicators 
of economic development, like the Gross Disposable Income per capita (e.g., Bollen and 
Jackman, 1985; Lipset et al., 2001; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), or a social-economic 
development definition, a reflex of the universal needs or characteristics, usually recognized, 
of development such as: high income levels, high human capital, high life expectancy at birth 
(e.g., Cutright, 1963; Olsen, 1968; Diamond, 1992). These authors emphasize the fact that 
monetary indicators, like the Gross Disposable Income per capita, do not reflect the standard 
of living of the population in general and they potentially underestimate the development in 
developing countries where a lot of the economic activity takes place in the informal 
economy. Other explanatory variables have been proposed, such as urbanization, urban 
wages/salaries and the consumption of energy (Bernhagem, 2001). Some authors explore 
alternative propositions, including variables such as cultural pluralism (Bollen and Jackman, 
1985), religious groups (Bollen 1979, 1983), military expenses (Lipset et al., 1991) and 
Center-Periphery relationships (Doorenspleet, 2001).  
Recent studies question and test the relationship between democracy and economic 
development in a dynamic perspective, choosing the growth rate of the Gross Disposable 
Income per capita as an indicator of economic growth (for instance, Barro 1991, 1996; 
Perotti, 1996; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Shen, 2002). These studies focus on the 
elaboration of explanatory models of economic growth, and therefore Democracy is an 
explanatory variable, among others, such as the stock of human capital, the degree of 
openness to the exterior, or public consumption.  
This study is framed into the first investigation line, i.e. the importance of Democracy (or of 
other regimes) for Economic Development (conjugating economic development, human 
development and gender-related development indicators). 6 
Sample of the countries in the study   
Studies that consider the relationship between Democracy and Development differ in relation 
to the segment of countries selected; for instance, Olsen (1968) and Vanhannen (1997) 
consider all independent countries; Cutright (1963) excludes the African countries from the 
analysis; Jackman (1973) looks for the non-communist regimes, Jackman (1973) and 
Bernhagen (2001) just include Latin American countries, and recent studies seek a larger 
coverage (Arat, 1991; Gasiorowksi, 1996; Doorenspleet, 2000). The present study follows 
these later, tring to maximize the number of countries to include in the sample. The sole 
restriction is the availability of data for the selected variables.   
Period of study   
The studies also refer to different moments in time; Bollen (1980, 1983), Bollen and Jackman 
(1985) and Copedge and Reinecke 1991 are some cases of cross-section studies. Arat (1991) 
selects the 1948-1984 period, Gasiorowksi (1996) Alvarez et al., (1996) include observations 
since 1950 and Vanhanen (1997) goes back to 1850. Some of these studies allow us to 
formulate the hypothesis that the relationship pattern between democracy and development 
varies throughout time and between 'democratization waves' (Huntington, 1991, Diamond, 
1992); for instance, Doorenspleet (2000) concludes that the relationship between democracy 
and development can be separated into the period before the Cold War and the period after. 
The present study is cross-section, with information since the year 2002. 
Nature of the statistical methods used 
Due to the democracy measurement scale and the type of relationship to be tested, the use of 
cross-tables (Coleman 1960; Huntington 1991), the analysis of correlations (Cutright, 1963; 
Neubauer, 1967; Olsen, 1968), the analysis of multiple regression (Jackman, 1973; Bollen and 
Jackan, 1985; Lipset, et al., 1991) and logistic regression models (Gasiorowski, 1996; Lipset 
et al., 1991; Doorenspleet, 2000) can be verified. 
In the proposed study, the methods to use should incorporate the multiple explanatory factors 
- Democracy, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Corruption - and should consider 
the diversity of political segments where the countries are framed. Therefore, having the 
variables selected a multivariate character, and considering the heterogeneity as a central 
requirement, we propose the use of the cluster analysis in the construction of a typology of 
segments of countries. In a second phase, regression analysis is used with the purpose of 7 
verifying if the different formed segments exhibit different behaviors in relation to the 
economic and human development variables. 
Type of linear or non-linear relationship 
Since Lipset’s (1959) initial work, there has been a lot of debate on the existing relationship 
between development and the presence of democracy and of it being or not linear. Przeworski 
and Limondi (1997) refer that the relationship is non-linear and there is a minimum threshold 
of development from which the probability of democracy being reached and maintained 
increases. The authors emphasize that results are influenced by the measurement used to 
quantify democracy (metric or non-metric). The used methodology - constitution of groups of 
countries - allows the estimate of different proximities inter segments and the definition of 
non-lineal hierarchies for the segments.   
In the following section a thorough description of the methodology used in the present study 
is presented.   
3. Variables and classification methods    
In the segmentation that involves countries as an analysis unit, just as in any other 
segmentation process, two technical options are necessary: the choice of the segmentation 
base – the variables used, and a classification method option.    
In the present work 10 subjective indicators are used for the political factors (PNUD, 2002) to 
classify 124 countries based on the fuzzy classification method fuzzy k-means.   
3.1 Political factors 
The democracy can be defined as a system of institutionalized procedures for an open and 
competitive political participation, the election of the main government’s leaders and 
substantial limits to the leaders' powers (PNUD, 2002). Considering that a truly democratic 
government requests the citizens' widespread and substantive participation and the 
responsibility of the people that have the power, the use of subjective indicators, based on the 
specialists' opinions on the degree of democracy of a country, constitutes the most appropriate 
approach for the reception of this qualitative concept for each country (in spite of the possible 
bias resulting of knowledge differences, opinion and the specialists' perception). In this work 8 
the data used is the one published in the United Nations Report (PNUD, 2002), which comes 
from several sources (Appendix).
2 
Thus, the classification is made based on a segmentation base of 10 variables, defined in 
evaluation scales that intend to capture the extension of democracy, governmental 
effectiveness and rule of law and corruption level (Table 2). It is important to emphasize that 
the variables civil freedom, political rights and freedom of the press are codified contrarily to 
the remaining ones, therefore its increase represents a more negative classification.   
Table 2: Political factors: characterization of the segmentation variables 





 IV dataset University of 
Maryland
 -10 (less democratic) to 10 (most 
democratic)
4,33 6,29 10 -10
Civil liberties Freedom House
1-2,5 free; 3-5 partly free; 6-7 not 
free
3,44 1,69 7 1
Political rights Freedom House
1-2,5 free; 3-5 partly free; 6-7 not 
free
3,21 2,12 7 1
Freedom press Freedom House
0-30 free; 31-60 partly free; 61-100 
not free
43,83 23,84 100 5
Voice and accountability
World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset
 -2,5 (worst) to 2,5 (better)   0,18 0,92 1,73 -1,93
Political stability and lack of 
violence
World Bank   -2,5 (worst) a 2,5 (better) 0,13 0,86 1,61 -2,01
Law and order
International County Risk 
Guide
0 (worst) a 6 (better) 3,83 1,41 6 0,50
Rule of law
World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset
 -2,5 (worst) a 2,5 (better) 0,12 0,94 1,91 -1,50
Government effectiveness
World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset












World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset


















































In the present study a fuzzy classification method is used to identify the component countries 
of each segment (it is assumed that a country can belong to more than a segment, thus being 
calculated the respective probabilities of belonging). . 
3.2. Fuzzy k-means 
The governmental classification of the 124 countries is based on a fuzzy classification 
approach – the Fuzzy k-Means (FKM) proposed by Bezdek (1973, 1974) and Dunn (1974). 
The model and its associated algorithm were developed on the Statistical package, according 
to the Statistical Basic programming language.  
                                                 
2 Polity IV Database (Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland); 
Freedom House and Indexes from the World Bank. 9 
The Fuzzy- k-means model is a fuzzy version of the non-overlapping partition model hard k-
means or hard ISODATA algorithm, and it is  based on the generalized fuzzy variance 
criterion:  










ns FKM d p J                         (1) 





 represents  the membership degree of object n () N n 1 ≤ ≤           
in group s () S s 1 ≤ ≤ .  The extension is made by introducing a weight r, named ‘fuzziness 
factor’, which characterizes the family { } ∞ < ≤ r 1 JFKM . If  1 r = , the obtained solution would 
be a non-overlapping partition. If r tends to the infiniteness then the membership degree 
values to each class become close to1 S . The fuzzy partition degree grows with r, and 2 is the 
most used value (Dunn’s original version (1974)). From (1) we can infer that  FKM J  is a 
function of 
2
ns d , a measurement  of the error incurred on the representation of the object n by 
the centroid  s v of each group s:  
( )( ) s n
T
s n A s n ns v x A v x d − − = − = v x
2                          (2) 
Three choices are possible for matrix A, which lead to the Euclidean, Diagonal and 
Mahalanobis distance.  
Thus, the FKM model constitutes a nonlinear optimization model, which is synthesized in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Fuzzy k-means model 
() ( )
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The optimal strategy to minimize the  FKM J  function, subdivided into classical stages – 
Initialization (1 and 2), Iteration (3 and 4) and Stop Criterion (5 ) - is synthesized in Table 4. 
 10 
Table 4: Fuzzy k-means algorithm 
(1) Determining an initial fuzzy partition matrix, selecting the distance measure and parameter 
r fixation. 

















v                             (3) 
where  nk x   represents the value of variable k ( ) K k 1 ≤ ≤  for object n () N n 1 ≤ ≤ . 
(3) Construction of a new fuzzy partition matrix (determination of the new membership 
values): 
(3.1) if an object n keeps a distance 0 from the centre of class s, the value of  ns p  is  
equal to 1 and the membership values of n towards the remaining classes is equal to 0; 
(3.2) if all the distances from an object to the centroids of the S groups are above 0, the 
membership values are determined by: 














= ∑         ( 4 )  
(4) Calculation of the group centroids associated to the partition determined in 3  from 
expression (3). 
(5) Repetition of steps 3 and 4 until the stop criterion is reached. 
                                                                                         Source: adapted from Dunn (1974: 37)                               
4.  Political classification  
4.1. Determining of the number of segments   
For the selection of the number of existent groups in the data, the validation measures used 
are the ones proposed by Riviera et al. (1990) - 'Minimum Hard Tendency' and 'Mean Hard 
Tendency’.
3 These are robust measures, totally independent from the number of segments and 
                                                 
3  For each country the quotient between its two highest membership degrees (rs) is defined; this quotient ranges between 0 
(non-overlapping membership of country n) and 1 (completely fuzzy membership). Additionally, a hard partition matrix is 
defined based on the highest membership values in the fuzzy membership partition matrix. The set of countries belonging to 11 
of the size of the data being classified and they don't exhibit the undesirable tendency to 
underestimate of the number of segments revealed by other measures published in the 
literature. The search of the best partition of the clustering suggests the maximization of these 
functions.
4 This way a 6-class segment is chosen (Table 5).  
Table 5: Selection of the number of segments 
23456 7
Number of iterations 12 20 31 46 27
didn't 
converge
Minimum Hard Tendency 0,719 0,652 1,237 0,786 1,386
Mean Hard Tendency 0,647 0,492 0,629 0,540 0,644
Criteria
Number of Political Groups
 
4.2. Evaluation of the heterogeneity in the government   
We now proceed to the classification using the fuzzy classification algorithm fuzzy k-means. 
The derivation of a non-overlapping partition matrix from the matrix of fuzzy partition allows 
obtaining six relatively balanced segments (Segment 1-18; Segment 2-23; Segment 3-20; 
Segment 4-18; Segment 5-24; Segment 6-21) in terms of dimensions (number of countries). 
The result of the non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis test for the difference between segment 
centroids reveals that all the variables present different mean patterns (statistically significant) 
in the obtained result (Table 6).   
                                                                                                                                                          




max : .  The hard tendency of each segment s (Ts)is defined 
as de average of all quotients rn of countries classified in non-overlapping cluster s. Mean hard tendency is defined as 
() 10 1 1l o g
S
s s ST
= − ∑  and Minimum hard tendency is calculated through  ( ) 10 1 max log s sS T
≤≤ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦  . 
4Notice that the fuzzy partition obtained tends towards to be non-overlapping as Minimum hard tendency and Mean hard 
tendency values increase.  12 






















Cluster 1 18 -3,78 5,39 6,06 71,44 -1,06 -0,96 2,61 -0,93 -0,87 -0,77
Cluster 2 23 7,52 2,96 2,26 36,04 0,27 0,07 2,80 -0,35 -0,31 -0,42
Cluster 3 20 4,95 4,20 3,80 55,35 -0,31 -0,74 3,00 -0,67 -0,76 -0,70
Cluster 4 18 -5,17 5,44 6,00 71,83 -0,64 0,43 4,56 0,31 0,30 0,06
Cluster 5 24 9,04 2,17 1,33 26,54 0,91 0,52 4,29 0,60 0,53 0,53
Cluster 6 21 9,95 1,29 1,00 13,48 1,45 1,29 5,62 1,60 1,55 1,70
106,0 103,5 106,5 84,3 100,7 72,8 62,2 84,7 91,0 66,4
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Centroid
Kruskal-Wallis 
Significance value  
Segment 6 includes the 21 countries that occupy the best positions in all indicators: they 
present the most democratic systems of the sample and register the highest degree of respect 
for civil and political laws; they possess the institutional factors (laws and institutions) 
necessary for an effective democratic participation. These countries are the leaders of 
democracy and have one of the largest governmental effectiveness, thus can be classified as 
Political Vanguard.   
Segment 5 gathers the countries that present close profiles of the first Segment, but less 
effective on the democratic and of government effectiveness level. They occupy the second 
place in all 10 variables, of political nature, considered. It is the Politically Developed 
Segment.   
Segment 4 includes the 18 countries that present the largest deficit in the democratic 
variables: political organization, political rights and freedom of the press and the next to last 
place in the voice and accountability indicator. They are characterized by political systems 
where the citizens' participation is restricted, there is little objectivity in the media and 
limitations to the freedom of expression; the main government leaders' recruitment is 
considered to be the least competitive of the sample. In spite of this, they present positive 
results in the variables associated to rules of law and government effectiveness, and 
corruption doesn't assume a very expressive place. This Segment is named the Political 
Effectiveness Segment.    
In Segment 3 there are 20 countries that present, in average, the second worst punctuations in 
political stability and lack of violence, law and order, rules of law, government effectiveness 
and graft, the fourth worst positions in civil freedom, political rights and freedom of the press 
but they possess some (although weak) political organization. It is a segment that, in a 
summarized way, can be considered as Restricted Governmental Practices.   13 
In Segment 2 are the countries that are positioned in the third place relatively to the 
democratic variables: political organization, civil freedom, political rights, freedom of press 
and voice and accountability; however they present negative indicators thus descending a 
position in the variables associated to rules of law, government effectiveness and graft. It is 
the Democratic Development Segment. 
In Segment 1 are included the countries that present the worst punctuations in terms of 
government effectiveness, and the second worst places in democracy terms. This is, therefore, 
a segment where there are limitations in the political process, civil freedom and freedom in 
developing points of view. These are Democratic Deficit countries.   
Figure 1 summarizes the relevant information for the interpretation of the structure of the 
















Law and order Rule of law Government
effectiveness
Graft
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6
 
Figure 1: Political factors: centroides of the segments 
After an analysis of the mean profiles, it becomes interesting to study the characteristics of 
some of the fuzzy classified countries (Figure 2) (i.e., those that share characteristics of more 
than one segment), referring the variables where these countries distance themselves from the 
centroides of the segments where they were classified and that eventually are share the 
characteristics of other segments:   14 
-  Spain, classified in Segment 6, assumes indicators that distances itself from this group 
in the criteria of political stability and lack of violence and law and order, assuming a 
similar pattern for these variables as the countries classified in the Segment 5. 
-  Thailand distances itself from the mean pattern of the countries of Segment 5 when 
assuming punctuations similar to those of the countries classified in Segment 2 in 
political organization, civil freedoms, political rights and graft; it assumes the second 
worst position in political stability and lack of violence and government effectiveness 
of Segment 5. 
4.3. Clustering validity 
If the criterion for the definition of a typical element of a segment is defined by membership 
degrees higher than 0,75, then 17 countries are typical of Segment 6, 10 of Segment 5, 5 of 
Segment 4, 2 of Segment 3, and 1 of Segment 2. This can be quantified by the ratio of this 




1  (Hruscha 1986). Otherwise the homogeneity intra-segment is larger in Segment 6, 
followed by Segment 5, Segment 4, Segment 3, Segment 2 and Segment 1.  
Table 7: Fuzzy cardinality of the segments 
C l u s t e r  1C l u s t e r  2C l u s t e r  3C l u s t e r  4C l u s t e r  5C l u s t e r  6
[ 1 ; 0 , 7 5 ] 0125 1 0 1 7
]0,75;0,5] 10 11 9 6 8 4
]0,5;0,25] 10 19 21 8 16 4
]0,25;0] 104 93 92 105 90 99
17,85 22,07 21,4 16,02 24,06 22,61
0,000 0,045 0,093 0,312 0,416 0,752
Fuzzy membership degree
Fuzzy cardinality
Number of typical countries/fuzzy 
cardinality  15 




Luxembourg Spain Czech Republic
Norway Cyprus Trinidad and Tobago El Salvador
Netherlands Chile Lithuania Thailand Philippines
United States Estonia South Africa Mexico
Sweden Botswana Croatia Brazil
New Zealand Latvia Namibia Peru
United Kingdom Costa Rica Bulgaria Madagáscar
Iceland Greece Panama Romania
Finland Mongolia Jamaica Dominica Republic











United Arab Emigrates Moldavia
Oman Tanzania
Viet name Burkina Faso
Cuba
Tunisia Malaysia Armenia
Morocco Iran, Islamic Rep. of Bangladesh
Kuwait Ethiopia Albania
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Figure 2: Political factors: segmentation structure 16 
5.  Political factors: contribution for economic and human development    
Here we verify, for the obtained classification structure, if the respective segments appear 
associated to different Gross Disposable Income levels per capita, of human development and 
gender-related development. In order to accomplish that, the model of multiple lineal 
regression is used, considering, as explanatory variables, the dummy variables related to the 
segments (5 Dummy variables where Di=1, if the observation belongs to Segment i, 
i=1,2,3,4,5; 0, otherwise) and as dependent variables, one at a time, Gross Disposable Income 
per capita
5, Human Development Index (HDI)
6 and Gender-Related Development Index 
7 
(GDI).   
The univariate statistical analysis of the three dependent variables in the sample of 124 
countries allows the extraction the following conclusions (Table 7 and Figure 3):   
- Gross Disposable Income per capita assumes a left-bias distribution, 50% of the countries 
present a higher Gross Disposable Income per capita value than 5878; it possesses an 
extreme outlier, Luxembourg, registering a Gross Disposable Income per capita of 50061, 
and a moderate outlier, for a Gross Disposable Income per capita of 24142, in the USA; the 
mean for 5% is 8502. 
- The mean value of HDI is 0,7 and 50% of the countries register values higher than 0,748; 
the minimum value is 0,277 (Niger) and the maximum 0,942 (Norway).   
- The behavior of the GDI is similar to the HDI. However the mean value (0,708) and the 
median (0,716) are smaller, thus suggesting a small inequality between men and women in 
the sample.   








GDP pc 9362 [7648;11075] 5878 9640 523 50061
HDI 0,710 [0,679;0,742] 0,748 0,177 0,277 0,942
GDI 0,708 [0,674;0,740] 0,744 0,180 0,263 0,956  
 
 
                                                 
5 The Gross Disposable Income per capita is a measurement of a country’s well being. 
6 HDI is a summary of three dimensions of the concept human development: live a long and healthy life, be educated and 
have a dignified lifestyle. It combines life expectancy, education and income.   
7 GDI adjusts the HDI to the inequalities between men and women.  17 
 
 
Figure 3: Boxplot: GDPpc, HDI and GDI 
Economic development – Gross Disposable Income per capita 
When determining the Gross Disposable Income per capita, we can conclude (equation 1) 
that the political segments (through the two dummy variables D1, D2, D3, D4 and D5) are 
statistically significant (at 1%) either individually or globally considered. The political 
Segments explain 73,4% of the Gross Disposable Income per capita variations. The countries 
that present the highest Gross Disposable Income per capita in mean terms are the ones 
classified in Segment 6, located in the Political Vanguard, followed by Politically Developed 
countries, classified as Segment 5, Political Effectiveness countries (Segment 4), Democratic 
Development countries (Segment 2), countries with Restricted Governmental Practices 
(Segment 3) and Democratic Deficit countries (Segment 1).   
Human development - Human Development Index (HDI)   
To evaluate the importance of the political factors in a country’s performance the Human 
Development Index, that adjusts the Gross Disposable Income per capita indicator according 
to social factors, was also considered. The democratic Segments (equation 2) reveal their 
strong explanatory capacity again (their three variables explain about 56,3% of the variations 
of HDI). The hierarchy of the HDI mean values remains, in relation to the Gross Disposable 
Income per capita (Segment 6-5-4-3-2-1).   18 
Table 8: Influence of the politicians in economic performance and human development 
 
Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3 
 



























































Human development – Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) 
Next, the relationship between the political segments and IDH is analyzed and adjusted to the 
inequalities between men and women. Once again a statistically significant relationship is 
verified, both individually and globally (R2=56,8%). The highest differential between the 
mean values of the HDI and the GDI occurs in Segment 1 (IDG=0,512 versus IDH=0,534), 
revealing inequalities disfavoring women.    
Conclusion 
The pioneering work of Lipset (1959) originated a great number of empirical studies about the 
relationship between Democracy and Economic Development. Using several methodologies, 
the studies are consensual in the results - in sectional terms, a positive but not perfect 
correlation exists, between the two variables.     
In this work an alternative methodology in the study of the relationship between economic 
development and democracy is proposed. The conjugation of a group of data on subjective 19 
indicators obtained from the specialists' opinion, related not only to the democratic profile of 
the countries, but also to government effectiveness, was an innovation in this type of studies. 
Based on this set of 10 variables, we proceeded to the classification of the 124 countries, with 
the objective of systemizing the heterogeneity of the sample in relation to political indicators.  
The advantages of the fuzzy classification methods are demonstrated (method fuzzy k-means) 
in the international classification context, when detecting countries that share characteristics 
of more than one segment.  
The partition made revealed pertinent because it allows the countries to be grouped according 
to their degree of political development based on concrete variables - six segments are 
identified, denominated as Political Vanguard (Segment 6), Politically Developed (Segment 
5),  Political Effectiveness (Segment 4), Restricted Governmental Practices (Segment 3), 
Democratic Development (Segment 2) and Democratic Deficit (Segment 1). In hierarchical 
terms, the Political Vanguard Segment is followed by the Politically Developed Segment in 
the Evaluation of the Government; Segments 4 and 2 share positions amongst themselves, i.e., 
the  Political Effectiveness Segment presents a political deficit, but good indicators of 
governmental effectiveness, and the Democratic Development Segment presents weak 
punctuation in government effectiveness and better punctuation (relative) in the government 
indicators. Segments 3 and 1 can again be nested, the Democratic Deficit Segment occupying 
the worst positions.  
These Segments also implicate the access to certain levels of economic and human 
development. The defined hierarchy corresponds to different mean punctuations in the 
indicators of economic and human development; surprisingly, in the Segments that share 
positions in the hierarchy (4 and 2), the countries that possess better result in the indicators of 
government effectiveness (and worse in the democratic indicators) reveal better indicative 
means of well-being.  
To conclude, in this study evidence of a positive relationship between democracy and 
economic and human development was once again demonstrated, thus presenting new 
insights for the understanding of the heterogeneity of behaviors in the indicators of the 
evaluation of the government.     
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Appendix 
Indicator Variables Concept measured Source
Competitiveness of chief recruitment
Openness of chief executive recruitment
Constraints on chief executive
Regulation of participation
Regulation of executive recruitment
Competitiveness of participation
Freedom of expression and belief
Freedom of association and organizational rights
Rule of law and human rights
Personal economy and economics rights
Free and fair elections for offices with real power
Freedom of political organization
Significant opposition
Freedom from domination by powerful groups
autonomy or political inclusion on minority groups
Media objectivity
Freedom of expression and belief
Free and fair elections






Business is kept informed of developments in laws and policies
Business ca express its concerns over changes in laws and policies
Political stability and lack of 
violence
Perceptions of the likelihood of destabilization (ethnic tensions, 
armed conflict, social unrest, terrorist threat, internal conflict, 
fractionalization of the political spectrum, constitutional changes, 
military coups)
World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset
Legal impartiality
Popular observance of the law
Black markets
Enforceability of private government contracts
Corruption in banking
Crime and theft as obstacles to business
Losses from and costs of crime
Unpredictability of the judiary
Bureaucratic quality
Transaction costs
Quality of public health care
Government stability
Corruption among public officials
Corruption as an obstacle to business
Frequency of "irregular payments" to officials and judiciary








World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset











































International Country Risk 
Guide
Rule of law
World Bank Governance 
Indicators Dataset
Government effectiveness












Polity IV dataset University of 
Maryland
Civil liberties Freedom House
Political rights Freedom House
Press freedom Freedom House
Voice and accountability
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